

COMOR-D-13/39

25X1

Revised

5 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Sea Surveillance by Satellite

1. The attached memorandum submitted by the Navy is a substitute for that previously forwarded to you under our covering memorandum of 2 March. This memorandum was recalled on 8 March 1965.

2. It is requested that you review the Navy proposal. It will be scheduled for discussion at an early COMOR meeting.

Executive Secretary

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment:
Subject paper

Copies 2, 3	State TCO
4	DIA
5, 6, 7, 8	DIA TCO
9, 10	OACSI TCO
11, 12	ONI TCO
13, 14, 15, 16	AFNIN TCO
17, 18	NSA TCO
19, 20, 21	NRO TCO

25X1

25X1

25X1

Handle Via
BYEMAN-COMINT
Control Systems Only

COMOR-D-13/39
Revised

(BYE-26023/65, 1 Mar 65)

(BYE-26034/65, 30 Mar 65)

From: Navy Member, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance
To: Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Subj: Sea Surveillance by Satellite

Ref: (a) NAVY COMOR Member letter BYE-26023/65 of 1 March 1965

1. For some time the Navy has been studying in cooperation with other agencies the problems of worldwide sea surveillance. It has been concluded that it is feasible to contribute uniquely to sea surveillance by earth satellite vehicles, and that necessary capabilities might be incorporated into programs presently under consideration. Before funds are expended for development and adaptation of capability for sea surveillance, the intelligence requirement for such a capability must have USIB approval.

2. While the general threat from missile launching submarines and surface ships at sea is easy to recognize, there are also other national intelligence requirements for current position and identification data on other ships and craft engaged in military, intelligence collection, or clandestine activities. Under conditions of cold war the movement of such less obviously identifiable threats may be of particular national and military concern, because they may be indicators. The extensive operations to locate and identify Soviet missile-transporting merchant ships enroute to Cuba in the summer of 1962, and subsequent efforts to report on suspect arms carriers elsewhere in the world illustrate national intelligence requirements for effective sea surveillance. At present most intelligence on naval and maritime movements is derived from [redacted] port observers, 25X1 accredited diplomatic personnel, and air and surface surveillance of strategic water areas by naval forces. In times of tension and [redacted] 25X1 most of these sources become less effective or may be diverted to other tasks, while the needs for current national and tactical intelligence become more critical.

3. The intelligence requirements for sea surveillance include identification and tracking of those targets which can threaten U.S. forces or our allies, or engage in operations affecting U.S. national interests. They are:

Handle Via
BYEMAN-COMINT
Control Systems Only

COMOR-D-13/39
Revised

- a. Nuclear and conventional submarines.
- b. Missile launching cruisers, destroyers, and smaller craft such as OSA and KOMAR boats.
- c. Merchant ships over 1000 gross register tons.
- d. Certain smaller craft down to 100 gross register tons equivalent, such as signal intelligence collection trawlers, high speed raiders, and clandestine agent transports.

Sea surveillance of such targets, once identified, should be able to provide current data on position within 50 nautical miles, course within $\pm 25^\circ$, speed ± 5 knots, and be at least 90% effective in continuous reporting.

4. While this requirement is essentially national, it should be noted that the position, movements, and identity of all ships and submarines in a particular area also has major tactical significance. Expeditious collection and dissemination of such tactical data do however determine the effectiveness of forces in entire theaters of operations, and have major strategic consequences. This requirement should be regarded as both of strategic and tactical importance.

5. For the information of COMOR it is estimated that a satellite surveillance system to contribute to satisfaction of these requirements calls for extensive technical capabilities. Effective sea surveillance of maritime targets which can be positioned over two thirds of the earth's surface, and move unpredictably within their speed capabilities, may require means for rapid, repeated, all-weather, night-or-day location and identification of seaborne surface and subsurface targets, to distinguish specific targets of interest from among the many ships and craft at sea. Without prejudging, it is considered such a system should consider:

- a. Multiple sensors such as means to command moored sonabuys, infra-red and radar, optical observation equipment, and photo systems of adequate resolution to record observations;

25X1

- b. Processing and command/communications equipment;

Handle Via
BYEMAN-COMINT
Control Systems Only

TOP SECRET

COMOR-D-13/39
Revised

c. Compatibility with data processing systems to permit rapid analysis and transmission of intelligence to users.

6. Since a sea surveillance requirement involves such a specific combination of elements, it is recommended COMOR submit this requirement at the earliest opportunity, even though it is subsequently incorporated in the prospective statement of other long range development requirements.

/S/

B. L. GARBOW

as revised by

/s/

R. P. Ray
Acting

Handle Via
BYEMAN-COMINT
Control Systems Only

TOP SECRET

Handle Via
BYEMAN-COMINT
Control Systems Only

COMOR-D-13/39
Revised

Copy	1	DCI TCO for USIB/S	
	22	TSO CIA	
	23	TCO <input type="text"/>	25X1
	24-33	Asst Ops/NPIC	
	34	Special Center TCO	
	35, 36	CGS	
	37, 38	CIA COMOR Member	
	39	CGS ReqBr/ReconGrp	
	40	Ch/COMOR Wkg Grp	
	41	AD/SI	
	42	DDP TCO	
	43	DDS&T TCO <input type="text"/>	25X1
	44	C/Action/DDS&T	
	45	C/SAS/DDS&T	
	46	AD/EL	
	47	AD/SA	
	48	FA/OSA	
	49	ID/OSA	
	50	SS/OSA	
	51	SAL/OSA	
	52-55	SA(COMOR)/DDS&T	

Handle Via
BYEMAN-COMINT
Control Systems Only

TOP SECRET